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ABSTRACT
Hegde, Prajwal Bhaskara, M.S., Purdue University, August 2016. Monitoring DBMS
Activity To Detect Insider Threat Using Query Selectivity . Major Professor: Elisa
Bertino.
The objective of the research presented in this thesis is to evaluate the importance
of query selectivity for monitoring DBMS activity and detect insider threat. We pro-
pose query selectivity as an additional component to an existing anomaly detection
system (ADS). We first look at the advantages of working with this particular ADS.
This is followed by a discussion about some existing limitations in the anomaly detec-
tion system (ADS) and how it affects its overall performance. We look at what query
selectivity is and how it can help improve upon the existing limitations of the ADS.
The system is then implemented using Java on top of the existing query parser used
by the AD mechanism which in itself is written in Java. Towards the end, we look
at how our version of the anomaly detection mechanism using query selectivity fares
against a Relational database management system (RDBMS) query optimizer. With
high accuracy results that closely match the results produced by the underlying query
optimizer, we provide some proof of concept(PoC) for adding query selectivity to the
existing AD mechanism .We conclude that a tool to analyze SQL and evaluate query
selectivity is required to make the anomaly detection mechanism more maintainable
and self-sustained.
11. INTRODUCTION
Insider threat is often perceived as an act of disloyalty carried out by disgruntled or
old employees from an organization who benefit from causing harm to the organiza-
tion. This insider perpetrator may or may not carry out a full-fledged cyber-attack
on his/her own but can aid malicious activities or actors who possess sufficient re-
sources to engage in such an attack. Cyberattacks are costing companies millions
and millions of dollars despite them trying to safeguard their systems and networks
against hackers. Globally, the insider threat has grown because the value of enter-
prise data has increased significantly in recent years [1]. Accordingly, the challenge
of detecting insider threats has been emerging as a big research topic in the field of
information security over the last few years. Most of the existing defense mechanisms
like intrusion detection systems, firewalls, anti-virus software only protect us against
external facing threats.
One of the main advantages of using Database Management Systems (DBMS) and
RDBMS over file systems was the ability to provide access control. DBMS enables
database administrators to grant users and applications specific roles and privileges
based on their requirements. These access control mechanisms however are not enough
to safeguard our databases because they dont defend against malicious insiders and
compromised applications. Hackers for instance can use some unknown vulnerability
in a privileged application and use it to fire malicious queries. OS and network level
firewalls will not be able to detect such anomalies because they only monitor system
logs and network logs respectively. Moreover, insider threat can be more than just
disloyal and disgruntled employees. Social and political factors that shape an indi-
viduals ethics and morals play a big role in information security policy compliance.
2Given all these reasons, the need for an anomaly detection that detects malicious
activities from previously trusted applications and users is imperative. Some of the
previous work done in this topic demonstrate the integration of a DBMS specific
anomaly detection (AD) mechanism within the core of the DBMS functionality [2].
User actions that are deemed malicious for a DBMS are not identified malicious by
existing OS and network level AD systems. To understand this better, consider an
example from the healthcare industry. Medical records that are not maintained elec-
tronically, are worth more than credit card information because of the possibility of
its abuse. Healthcare professionals like receptionists, nurses and doctors have regular
access to such healthcare records. Consider a receptionist who needs to access the
contact information of a hospitals patients to confirm their daily appointments. She
uses some privileged application with her login credentials and fires a query to obtain
the contact numbers of all the patients listed for a particular day. Occasionally, she
might need to access the patients address or emergency contact information. This
information is part of the hospitals patient database and the receptionist has been
granted privilege to access it. Now, suppose that the residence and office address of a
patient was queried using the receptionists login credentials on a particular day. How
can this activity be flagged? This can be a premeditated attempt to steal the data
or attackers getting access to the privileged application in some manner.
Most of the RDBMS systems which use SQL maintain their logs in forms of SQL
queries which are not parsed by existing OS and network level AD systems. The
approach described by Shebaro, B. et al. [2] in the above paper describes the imple-
mentation of an AD system that parses such SQL query logs and finds anomalies.
In some proceeding work done in [3], we come across DetAnom which is an anomaly
detection mechanism that does the AD work in 2 stages: Profile creation phase and
anomaly detection phase. In the profile creation phase, DetAnom creates a profile
of the application program which can succinctly represent the normal behavior in
terms of its interaction with the database. After a sufficient profile creation, the
3anomaly detection phase is used to detect anomalous queries before it even reaches
the database. One of the main advantages of using this type of AD detection is that it
tightly integrates the AD mechanism with the database. In other words, the anomaly
detection is active and not passive.
However, we found some exceptional cases that can be termed as anomalies but
are not caught by this AD engine. For each query in the profile creation phase, the
corresponding signature and constraints are recorded. This signature is composed of
a tuple representation of the query which is used to depict query features like table
name, selected columns, and filter columns. When the system in anomaly detection
phase, these signatures and constraints are compared with the new query to decide
if the query is anomalous or not. The scope of this research was to identify anomaly
cases that were not handled by this existing AD mechanism. After identifying such
cases, the end result of this research would be to add additional features to the AD
mechanism to deal with such exception cases.
In this thesis, we have proposed and implemented an addition to the DetAnom mech-
anism by adding query selectivity to it. Using query selectivity, we were able to add
more anomaly detection features to the mechanism making it more maintainable and
self-sustained. We built this implementation on some ongoing research in query se-
lectivity [4] to improve anomaly detection. By calculating the selectivity of queries
fired by privileged applications against its database, we get an idea of the volume
of data returned by these queries. Using this volume estimation, we can further fine
tune the exiting AD mechanism in DetAnom.
1.1 Scope
1. Identify queries that are exceptions and not handled by the existing DetAnom
AD mechanism.
42. Identify additional functionality that should be added to the AD mechanism to
handle these exceptional cases.
3. Evaluate query selectivity and how it will help make the DetAnom AD mecha-
nism more maintainable and autonomous.
4. Using bulk data generation tools, compare the selectivity obtained by this ex-
tended DetAnom mechanism with the selectivity obtained by the underlying
RDBMS query optimizer.
1.2 Assumptions
1. We assume that the user interacts with the database using SQL commands only.
2. We assume that the underlying database has role based access control (RBAC)
where in the users are given privileges based on their roles.
3. The anomaly detection module will work in similar sync after adding additional
query selectivity features to the query parser module.
4. Query selectivity for complex queries can be evaluated similarly and will remain
consistent with the outcome of this thesis.
5. This additional module will improve DetAnom’s anomaly detection accuracy
but it will not make DetAnom foolproof.
6. Other DBMS systems (besides PostgresQL) will produce similar results.
1.3 Limitations
1. No connectivity with the back-end database. We are working only with the
query parser module of the AD mechanism which intercepts every query before
it reaches the database.
52. Within the scope of this thesis, we limit ourselves to handle mostly simple
queries which use logical operators like AND, OR and NOT alongside condi-
tional operators like <, > and =.
3. Complex queries with subqueries and JOIN operators are not handled by the
existing query selectivity addition.
62. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
In this section, we review all the existing work done on RDBMS anomaly detection.
We look at the pros and cons of different AD mechanisms that exist and why this
thesis is aimed on DetAnom? We look at the key advantages that separate this
anomaly detection mechanism from other ADS. Lastly, we address the limitations
that exist in DetAnom.
2.1 Existing Anomaly Detection Mechanisms:
As discussed in the introduction section, AD approaches for database systems
came into play after the advent of relational database management systems over tra-
ditional file systems. RDBMS is the basis for the standard query language (SQL)
which in turn is the basis for most database systems like MySQL, PostgreSQL, etc.
These database systems use SQL queries to carry out its functionalities. SQL queries,
unlike system and network level queries cannot be parsed by traditional AD systems
that monitor operating systems or networks. While tools like intrusion detection
systems (IDS), Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) and antivirus software among oth-
ers defend our IT infrastructure from an external attacker trying to penetrate our
systems, they are rendered useless against insider threats. The problem of securing
any and all data from such insider threats is very complicated and requires the right
combination of tools and policies to overcome it. Database based anomaly detection
provide an anomaly detection tool that can parse through SQL queries – used by
the user to interact with the database to flag anomalous behavior. Previous work
suggests that this approach can be both syntactic and semantic.
7Spalka et al. [5] proposed an approach of detecting anomalies using the state re-
lations which depends upon the users behavior and the different data points the user
hits during normal transactions. According to Spalka et al., their ADS is based on
how A user executes syntactically related commands, which place a specific load on
the DBMS. Mathew et al. [6] talks about another approach that models the users
database access using a multidimensional vector and then uses a training phase to
quantify these vectors. Chung et al. [7] propsed distance measure as a variable to
understand the data structure and semantics associated with the given query. This
distance measure is a quantity that explains the frequency of use of a particular
dataset with respect to the currently working scope. Overall, we see that several
syntactic and semantic attributes of SQL queries have been taken into consideration
to establish a baseline that distinguishes between normal and anomalous queries.
2.2 DetAnom
In the PostgreSQL anomalous query detector demonstrated by Shebaro, B. et
al. [2], the AD system is trained by extracting relevant features from the parse-tree
representation of the SQL commands, and then uses the DBMS roles as the classes for
the Bayesian classifier. Every SQL query is intercepted before it reaches the database.
The mechanism is split into two stages: the training phase and the anomaly detection
phase.
In the training phase, the mechanism relies on intrusion free transactions between
authorized users and the database. With every transaction, the underlying access
patterns are associated with user roles using a fine triplet representation. A fine
triplet representation was first introduced by Bertino et. al [8]. Triplets are our basic
unit for viewing the log files and are the basic components for forming user and role
pro- files, since subjects actions are characterized by sequences of such triplets. For
sake of simplicity in the adopted notation, we represent a generic triplet with T (c, R,
8A) 1, where c corresponds to the command, R to the relation information and A to
the attribute information. These fine triplets of SQL queries are then fed to a Nave
Bayes Classifier (NBC) which then outputs a corresponding identifier for every role
of the role based access control.
In the anomaly detection phase, Maximum Aposteriori Probability (MAP) is used
to determine the role associated with a new query. If the role predicted by the classi-
fier is different from the original role associated with the query, an anomaly behavior
is detected and the query execution stops.
DetAnom [3] was built on top of this PostgreSQL anomalous query detector. This
mechanism was designed to carry out concolic execution of a privileged application
program that interacts with the database. Similar to the PostgreSQL anomalous
query detector, DetAnom works in two stages: Profile creation and anomaly detec-
tion. In the profile creation phase, the application program is instrumented in a
concolic execution environment where in different constraints corresponding to dif-
ferent input values are applied. The objective is to cover all paths possible. Thus,
depending on the outcome, new inputs are provided that reverse branch conditions.
All of these generated queries are passed on the profile builder module and then to
the respective database. Once the query reaches the profile builder, corresponding
query signatures are generated that are similar to the triplet representation used in
the above mentioned paper. Queries’ signatures and corresponding constraints are
used to build the profile of the application. Thus, every query in the profile creation
phase gets associated with a query record which is a combination of its constraints
and associated query signature.
The anomaly detection phase of DetAnom involves each new query passing through
the QI (Query interceptor) to the ADE (Anomaly detection engine). Here the first
step is identifying the inputs of the executing application program. Based on the in-
9put parameters, the ADE finds the corresponding constraints and simultaneously the
query records associated with it. The signature generation sub-module then regen-
erates a signature of this received query and forwards it to the signature comparison
sub-module which verifies if the newly generated signature matches with the one in
the accompanying query record. If there is a mismatch, the AD engine raises a flag
and response actions are taken as specified. Strict and Flexible denote two forms of
response action that the ADE can take.
2.3 Advantages of DetAnom over other AD mechanisms
Some of the key advantages of using DetAnom in this thesis over other database
AD mechanism are as follows:
1. The anomaly detection mechanism is active. Every query is intercepted by
the DetAnom mechanism before it reaches the database. This eliminates the
possibility of a back door entry that is observed in other passive AD mechanisms.
2. The anomaly detection mechanism is implemented as an additional feature of
the database which makes the physical location of the underlying database
unimportant. This feature is particularly important in todays day and age as
enterprises are trying to move their data to the cloud or use third party database
services.
3. DetAnom is tightly integrated with the database which makes it handy to do
more than redirect anomalous queries. Several useful additions have been sug-
gested to this mechanism over the years; this research being one of the them.
Database administrators for instance can handle different types of anomalous
queries differently and implement response actions accordingly.
4. Since all SQL based database systems have the same nomenclature, DetAnom
is not restricted to any one form of DBMS and can be used to detect anomalies
in MS SQL, PostgreSQL and Oracle among others.
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2.4 Limitations in DetAnom
The query signature generation mechanism used in DetAnom only keeps track
of the tables and columns names mentioned in the query. Consider the following as
example in [3]:
Query:
SELECT employee id, work experience FROM WorkInfo WHERE work experience >
10;
Query signature:
{1, {{200, 1}, {200, 2}}, {200}, {{200, 2}}, 1}
This query signature is generated using the metrics in Table B.1 in Appendix.
Reading the query signature, we understand that the query is to SELECT (1) em-
ployee id (200, 1) and work experience (200,2) from WorkInfo (200). There where
condition depends on work experience (200, 2) and has 1 constraint (1).
This is a pretty accurate representation; more accurate than some other metrics
used in other database ADS. However, as we can see, the query signature doesnt
keep track of the constraints in the where condition except for the column name and
count. This gives rise to some potential anomalous queries that cannot be detected
by DetAnom.
To understand this limitation more clearly consider the following examples of queries
from Table B.2 in Appendix that will return different results but will be treated the
same by DetAnom.
DetAnom will generate the same query signatures for each of the query pairs shown
in Table B.2 in Appendix. Hence, DetAnom will not raise any flags if a privileged
11
user is trying to fire queries that have the same table and column names but differ in
some where condition constraints.
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3. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
In the following subsection, we look at:
1. What is query selectivity?
2. How can it be added to DetAnom?
3. How will it improve its overall performance?
3.1 Query Selectivity
Several relational database management systems maintain statistics in system cat-
alogs that are used to estimate the cost of operation and result sizes. These statistics
are maintained in system catalogs are used by query optimizers to estimate the cost
of operations and result sizes. Consider the System R Optimizer [9], which is one
of the most widely used query optimizers that works well for queries with less than
10 join conditions. When the number of joins in the query grows large however, this
can take an enormous amount of time and space. The query optimizers consider a
combination of CPU and I/O costs before deciding the most optimized path to take
to carry out the query functionality. There are innumerable ways to go about this;
the system R optimized only traverses the left-deep plans to find the most optimal
path. Here left deep plans indicate the output of each sub-part of a query is pipelined
to its adjacent left operation without storing it. Some other plans include single-
relation plans and multiple-relation plans. Depending on the underlying query plan,
the query optimizer estimates the CPU, I/O costs as well as the result sizes.
According to PostgreSQL documentation [10], The current PostgreSQL optimizer
implementation performs a near-exhaustive search over the space of alternative strate-
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gies. This algorithm, first introduced in the ”System R” database, produces a near-
optimal join order, but can take an enormous amount of time and memory space
when the number of joins in the query grows large.
While estimating result size, which indicates the maximum number of tuples returned
in a query result, the query optimizer calculates a reduction factor (RF) based on
the where condition. Reduction factor of a term in the WHERE clause is the ratio
of (expected) result size to input size [11]. So consider a query as following:
Query:
SELECT * from students WHERE age > 20;
Here the number of tuples returned by the first part of the query select * from
students; is limited by the conjunct where age > 20;. Thus the reduction factor will
be calculated as the number of tuples returned by the above query divided by the
number of tuples returned by same query without the where clause. Query selectivity
is one of the parameters evaluated by the query optimizer to find the most optimized
access path. Unlike RF, which evaluates each where clause conjunct, query selectivity
is used to compare access paths. To better understand the interdependency between
query selectivity and reduction factor, we say that query selectivity depends upon
the several conjuncts used in the query and the fraction of tuples that satisfy a given
conjunct is defined by the RF. In some cases, (not all), the query selectivity can be
the product of the reduction factors for each of the conjuncts in the where clause.
3.2 How Query Selectivity is evaluated
We refer to the official PostgreSQL documentation [12] to understand how query
selectivity is evaluated by its optimizer. Note that the reference to PostgreSQL is
because the implementation of this thesis was performed on top of PostgreSQL v9.5.
Similar query optimizers exist in almost all SQL based database systems.
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Consider the same query listed above:
select * from students where age > 20;
As per the given documentation, ”The planner examines the WHERE clause con-
dition and looks up the selectivity function for the operator < inpg operator. This
is held in the column oprrest, and the entry in this case is scalarltsel. The scalarltsel
function retrieves the histogram for unique1 from pg statistics.”
Here, the histogram is one of the data structure in pg statistics that divides the range
of values in each column into buckets. For the above query, the planner (query op-
timizer) will retrieve the corresponding histogram by running the following query in
the background:
Query:
SELECT histogram bounds FROM pg stats WHERE tablename =′ students′




{0, 5, 25, 50, 60, 100, 160, 172, 220, 400, 995}
Using this histogram bound values, the query selectivity is evaluated as follows:
Selectivity = (1+(20−bucket[2].min)/(bucket[2].max−bucket[2].min))/num buckets
= (1 + (20− 5)/(25− 5))/10
= 0.175
This indicates one whole bucket (0.1) plus a linear fraction of the second bucket
(0.075).
The number of rows returned can be calculated by:
No. of rows = selectivity ∗ cardinalityoftable(students)
= 0.175 ∗ 100
= 17.5
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This indicates that the query optimizer has now evaluated this access path obtain-
ing a selectivity of 0.175 which eventually will return around 18 tuples. Notice that
we have not actually parsed through the database to find out how many students aged
20 exist but are just using the histogram values. These statistics are then compared
against the selectivity of other access paths and the optimal query execution path is
selected.
3.3 Applying Query selectivity to DetAnom
As discussed in the Limitations of DetAnom section, the tuple representation used
in DetAnom does not account for the constraints in the where condition except for its
count and column names. Query selectivity is evaluated using the constraints applied
to a query in the where clause. Thus, in this research, we suggest that we add an
extra component to the query signature that indicates the query selectivity of the
given query.
Lets consider the following two queries as given in Table 2.2:
Legitimate Query:
SELECT * from WorkInfo WHERE salary > 150000
Anomalous Query:
SELECT * from WorkInfo WHERE salary > 0
As discussed in the above section, the selectivity value for the first query will be
calculated based on the logical operator used in the where clause (>) and comparison
value (15000). Similarly, the selectivity for the second query will be based on the
logical operator used in its where clause (>) and comparison value (0). Based on the
formula used in the above section, we understand that the selectivity value for the
anomalous query will be much higher than the legitimate query. In other words, we
now understand the selectivity of queries issued against the database; which indicates
the volume of data returned by that query can be used to differentiate anomalous
queries from legitimate ones. Adding this query selectivity component to DetAnom
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will enable the AD mechanism to detect anomalies in the volume of data return
before even executing the query. Our research is supported by some other ongoing
research [4] that explain how adding query selectivity improves the precision of the
anomaly detection. In this following section, we look at how query selectivity can be
calculated for different types of queries and how it can be integrated with the existing
DetAnom mechanism.
3.4 Implementation
The profile creation phase of DetAnom uses a general SQL parser [13] that is
used to dissect the SQL queries into components as desired by DetAnom. This SQL
parser is written in JAVA and is capable of parsing though a query and separating
out its tokens in a tree type representation. Since we have implemented the query
selectivity functionality on top of this SQL parser, we work though the plan tree of
the processed query from top to bottom in a Recursive-DFS (Depth first search) type
algorithm. We calculate the individual selectivitys for each where clause conjunct
and then based on the operators used, calculate the overall query selectivity. The
formulas for different comparison and expression type of SQL tokens and how their
respective selectivitys are calculated is given below:
3.4.1 Less than ’<’:
Query syntax:
SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 < value;
As indicated in one of the examples above, the PostgreSQL documentation shows
that the selectivity for ’<’ operator is calculated by the ’scalarltsel’ function using its
histogram bounds. We query the underlying database to obtain the histogram of the
respective column and use it in the following formula:
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Optimizer query:
SELECT histogram bounds FROM pg stats WHERE tablename =
table1′ AND attname =′ column2′;
Selectivity = ((i−1)+(value−bucket[i].min)/(bucket[i].max−bucket[i].min))/num buckets
Where,
i : Index of the bucket in which the value lies
bucket[i].min: lower bound of the ith bucket
bucket[i].min: upper bound of the ith bucket
num buckets: total number of buckets
3.4.2 Equal to ’=’:
Query syntax:
SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 = value;
The selectivity of queries with = operator is determined using the function for =,
which is eqsel. The eqsel function in turn looks up the most common values (MCVs),
most common frequencies (MCFs) and number of distinct values (num distinct) data
structures to evaluate its selectivity.
Optimizer query:
SELECT n distinct, most common vals, most common freqs FROM pg stats WHERE
tablename=’table1’ AND attname=’column2’;
Now, if the value exists in the MCVs, its selectivity is the MCF value correspond-
ing to the same index.
If the value does not exist in the MCVs, selectivity is calculated using:
Selectivity = (1− sum(mvf))/(num distinct− num mcv)
18
Where,
sum(mvf): sum of all values in the MCF list
num distinct: number of distinct values in column2
num mcv: count of MCVs
3.4.3 Greater than ’>’:
Query syntax:
SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 > value;
The maximum selectivity value of a given query can be 1. We have already dis-
cussed the selectivity for less than (<) and equal to (=).
We evaluate the selectivity of queries with > operator by subtracting the selectivity
of the same query with < and = operator from 1.
Selectivity = 1 - selectivity (SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 <
value;) - selectivity (SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 = value;)
3.4.4 NOT IN:
Query syntax:
select column1 from table1 where column2 NOT IN (value1, value2);
Again, similar to queries with > operator, we use mathematical logic to evaluate
the selectivity of queries with NOT IN operator.
Selectivity = 1 - selectivity (SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 =




SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 < value1 AND
column3 = value2;
Here, according to PostgreSQL documentation [12], The planner assumes that the
two conditions are independent, so that the individual selectivitys of the clauses can
be multiplied together:
Hence,
Selectivity = selectivity (SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 <
value1;) * selectivity (SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column3 = value2;)
3.4.6 OR:
Query syntax:
SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 < value1 OR column3 =
value2;
Using properties of set theory, we evaluate the selectivity of queries with OR condition
as,
Selectivity = selectivity (SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 <
value1;) + selectivity (SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column3 = value2;) -
selectivity (SELECT column1 from table1 WHERE column2 < value1 AND column3 =
value2;)
Now, considering the research purpose of our thesis is to explain that a tool to an-
alyze SQL and evaluate the query selectivity is required to make that project more
maintainable and self-contained, we have not integrated more complex queries involv-
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ing nested queries, JOIN conditions, sub-queries etc. Note that some of the complex
queries can also be simplified into queries which involve the basic set of operators
discussed above.
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To evaluate the efficiency of our query selectivity module in DetAnom, we compare
the selectivity and number of rows calculated by our project with the corresponding
value obtained from PostgreSQL and its query optimizer. Note that we can do the
same with other database engines like MySQL and Oracle since the underlying parser
works for all SQL based DBMS systems.
4.1 Setup
Firstly, we need a tool to populate test data and transactions. With sufficient
test data, we aim to expose any potential database performance issues. We looked at
some benchmarking tools like TPC-C and OLTPBench that generate arbitrary tables
and columns and provide a set of queries (in the form of transactions) that can be run
against them. In the end, we decided on using named ’Datanamic Data Generator for
PostgreSQL v6.1.0’ [14]. We found this tool to be quite handy in creating different
types of tables and populating them with meaningful attributes and columns depend-
ing upon our requirements. Several versions of Datanamic data generator exist for
other database systems like Oracle, MS SQL, MS Access, Azure, etc.
After connecting to the PostgreSQL database server, we created a table named stu-
dents and generated data according to specific requirements. In other words, it pro-
vides a well-defined data generation plan. The id column for instance was filled with
sequential integers that start with 1 and increment by 1. The dept column was filled
with a pre-existing list of department names. The departments will repeat 1 in 40
times; this was done so as to check the selectivity of queries that match a specific
department name. Similarly, the name and age columns were also populated with
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specific constraints to aid our calculations. Overall, 1000 tuples were populated as
shown in Fig A.1 in Appendix. The syntax of the table is shown in Fig A.2 in Ap-
pendix.
Similarly, other tables named ’customer’, ’owner’, etc. are created. Some with only
50 tuples while others with around 5000 tuples. and its syntax is shown in Fig A.3
in Appendix.
4.2 Analysis
Now after populating the databases, we calculate the numbers of rows using our
module and then using PostgreSQL try to gauge its accuracy. Before doing so, we
run ANALYZE which populates the statistical columns like pg stats within the Post-
greSQL query generator. Some of the queries along with their selectivitys are given
in Table B.3 in Appendix.
Based on our evaluation of 50 queries, the accuracy of the query selectivity mod-
ule implemented in this thesis is as provided in the Table B.4 in Appendix.
Based on these results, we come to the following observations:
1. The results produced by our query selectivity module (DetAnom using Query
selectivity) is very accurate (> 98%) for logical comparison operators like less
than (<), greater than (>) and equal to (=).
2. These results are accurately replicated by the PostgreSQL query optimizer as
well. Accuracy is approximately 100%
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3. The accuracy of both ’DetAnom with query selectivity’ and the PostgreSQL
query optimizer for the NOT IN condition is almost perfect (100%) for our
sample size.
4. The accuracy of ’DetAnom with query selectivity’ for the queries with AND con-
dition is very high (91.66%) and quite close to the accuracy of the PostgreSQL
query optimizer (94.4%).
5. The accuracy of ’DetAnom with query selectivity’ for the queries with OR
condition is pretty high as well (88.8%) and quite close to the accuracy of the
PostgreSQL query optimizer (92.2%).
24
5. SUMMARY
Overall, the implemented version of DetAnom with query selectivity was found to
be very accurate (Overall accuracy > 88%) in calculating query selectivitys and very
similar to the statistics obtained by the underlying query optimizer.
We started of with identifying anomalies in SQL based DBMS systems to detect
insider threat in an organization. We saw that adding query selectivity as an addi-
tional constraint to the query signature during the training phase will improve its
overall accuracy. After carrying out the research discussed in this thesis, we, we pro-
pose that adding query selectivity to the DetAnom ADS and other similar syntactic
based anomaly detection systems will help us identify further anomalies and thereby
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Fig. A.1. Populated Student Table
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Fig. A.2. Student Table Schema





























Select * from WorkInfo where salary
>150000
select * from WorkInfo where salary >0
select * from WorkInfo where em-
ployee id = ’x’ AND salary >10000
select * from WorkInfo where em-
ployee id = ’x’ OR salary >10000
select * from WorkInfor where em-
ployee id=’x’













Select * from student where
id <200;
200 199 199
Select * from student where
dept = Facilities;
183 183 183





credit card type NOT IN
(VISA,MASTERCARD);
184 184 184
Select * from customer
where cid >100 AND
first name NOT IN (’Elene’,
’Klara’);
127 139 131
Select * from student where
id <10 OR name = Duncan;
8 13 11
Select * from owner where













Less than operator (<) 98.3 100
Greater than operator (>) 100 100
Equal to (=) 100 100
NOT IN conditions 100 100
AND condition 91.66 94.4
OR condition 88.8 92.2
